PHILOSOPHY OF SPORT OR PHILOSOPHICAL REFLECTION ON SPORT

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The main task of my presentation is to initiate the discussion about the contemporary position, as well as the current formal and merit situation of philosophy of sport. It is interesting to answer the following question: if we can say, that, at the present time, we have a mature, competent and independent scientific discipline or that we are involved with something like philosophical reflections on sport, which will become, in the future, an independent philosophical discipline?

I am of the opinion, that the philosophy of sport has only initiated some process of structuralisation, of posing and solving manifold problems, of forming various viewpoints characteristic for authors of various education and different research preferences. It has also initiated building from the foundations and shaping of the methodological instruments which would be suitable for a new branch of philosophy aspiring for autonomy. The main burden of exploratory projects and their realisation lies on the shoulders of the philosophers in the strict sense of the word exploring various manifestations and aspects of sport.

The philosophy of sport is working on defining itself and working out its own properties and forms of research. An important opportunity for it is constituted by a co-operation with other branches of philosophy (and not only of philosophy) aimed at the utilisation of already worked out and tested patterns enabling the philosophy of sport to formulate its own language, coherent code, category of notions and specific detailed methodology in order to describe and explain sources, contents and senses characteristic for the practical and theoretical manifestations and properties of sport. However, until this stage of the forming of a new discipline is finished, we will face philosophical reflections on sport rather than the philosophy of sport.

Keywords: Philosophy of sport, philosophical reflection on sport, application.

INTRODUCTION

Considerations on the question of if the philosophy of sport is a science are situated within an older dispute concerning the question as to whether philosophy in its general sense – that is, philosophy as such – is science. There are, roughly speaking, two main standpoints on this issue. The first is genetically rooted in Hellenic antiquity; the second, on the other hand, in times nearer to the present day.

In the first case – I am thinking about the turn of the 7th and 6th century BC – philosophy was treated as the first and the only science, every science or the whole science. As a result of its inner differentiations its main branches came into being and autonomous specialized sciences were separated from it. If we assume the above mentioned viewpoint, philosophy in its general sense and its specialized branches – such as e.g. the philosophy of law, the philosophy of medicine or the philosophy of biology – are also treated as typical sciences, regardless of whether or not they have a strictly theoretical character (e.g. Plato’s views) or are of mixed theoretical and empirical character, as in the case of Aristotle’s inquiries (nota bene contemporarily philosophy has a strictly theoretical overtone). From the so-called genetic point of view, philosophy is treated as science regardless of whether or not it was practiced solely with theoretical methods or with theoretical and empirical methods. The methodology of research does not determine in this case whether philosophy possesses scientific qualities or not.

Proponents of the second standpoint in the dispute have referred to positivistic or, to be precise, neo-positivistic assumptions. They have pointed out that only such disciplines which use empirical methodologies and refer to the assumptions of physicalism, to the theory and language of physics, are science. All other disciplines – like for example the theoretical ones, the social ones or the humanities – which do not comply with these directives are only of metaphysical – that is, not scientific – character. From this viewpoint also philosophy in its general sense and various specialized philosophies are not sciences.

In the arguments which are presented below I opt for the first standpoint treating philosophy as science and consider from this viewpoint whether the philosophy of
sport is already science or if it is situated in the initial phase, which can be called philosophical reflection on sport and which constitutes a stage being necessary for the formation of the philosophy of sport as such.

There exists a view assuming that the philosophy of sport constitutes a specialized domain within the framework of general philosophy, that it functions as an autonomous academic discipline and that "it has been quite well for years". It is supposed to be testified to by, among other things, abundant literature on the subject. W. Liponski assumes that the appearance of this discipline took place in the 19th century.

This standpoint is supposed to be reinforced by P. McBride's work from 1932 entitled The philosophy of sport. It is maintained that the definite stabilization of the philosophy of sport took place in the years 1967–1979 when, inter alia, the following monographs appeared in print by H. Slusher (Man, sport and existence, 1967), P. Weiss (Sport – a philosophic inquiry, 1969), J. Morgan (On the path toward an ontology of sport, Journal of the Philosophy of Sport, 1976; Some Aristotelian notes on the attempt to define sport, Journal of the Philosophy of Sport, 1977), and H. Lenk (Social philosophy of athletics, 1979). In order to strengthen Liponski's argumentation (with which I do not agree) I would add to this list a book he does not know: Philosophy and human movement (1978) by D. Best; a monograph which is commonly regarded as excellent.

The sufficient justification of the discussed viewpoint is, according to Liponski, constituted by the elaborated views of H. Lenk included in the following articles: Prolegomena toward an analytic philosophy of sport (1985), Toward a social philosophy of achievement and athletics (1988) – as well as in collective works which were edited by him (e.g., inter alia: Aktuelle Probleme der Sport Philosophie, 1983).

The next milestones in the development of the philosophy of sport were, as it is maintained by Liponski, Philosophy of sport (1990) by D. Hyland and R. Scott Kretchmar's work: Practical philosophy of sport (1994).

The argumentation which is quoted by Liponski does not convince me, although I understand and appreciate his intentions, since, as a philosopher considering the issues of sport from the philosophical viewpoint, I myself would like the philosophy of sport to come into being at last and to develop as well as it is possible.

Unfortunately Liponski errs in this case. The context of justification he has worked out has a common sense – that is, a colloquial – character. From the fact that "there are works embracing the philosophy of sport in an overall way which are edited as books, specialist magazines which are dedicated to it, academic organizations and handbooks, and extensive bibliographies", it does not follow at all that "probably the discipline itself must exist", since it is superficial, non-philosophical and – I would say – banal reasoning.

Thus – and it is only my viewpoint, not the binding interpretation of the objective state of affairs – the fact of the matter is quite different.

At this time, the so-called philosophy of sport is still at the very beginning of its development and at least two or three centuries will pass before this discipline takes shape, and much more before it matures. At the present time – in my opinion – we are dealing with the initial phase demanding pioneer, arduous and time-consuming work in order to extract, like Socrates with his maieutic method, new, hitherto unknown philosophical assumptions specific only to the philosophy of sport from among uncultivated research areas.

Those who are philosophers because of their education – regarding formal and content-related instruments; that is, the knowledge they have – can do research on sport relatively easily. However, taking into account the whole population of philosophers, it is done by only a few. And if they discourse about it, they treat it rather as a sideline which does not bring them splendor in the philosophical milieu. The so-called philosophy of sport functions in this environment a bit like an illegitimate child. The decisive majority of philosophers takes persons dealing with the philosophy of sport with a pinch of salt. Certainly this does not facilitate its development.

That the philosophy of sport (I will continue to use this term although I would rather prefer to use the formulation "philosophical reflection on sport") can be described as being in its initial stage among other things on that ground that it is a philosophy which has an applicatory character. The formulation "applicatory character" means solely that the philosophy of sport at this stage of development only draws from general philosophy and specialized philosophies, from various branches, currents, ages, schools, trends, notions, terms, issues and assumptions in order to - expressing it briefly and using K. Ajdukiewicz's nomenclature - describe (ideographic endeavors), explain (nomotetic endeavors) and evaluate (the employment of axiology) all of which is done in accordance with given authors – from their own (that is, subjective) viewpoint – and considered to be connected with sport.

The philosophy of sport primarily applies – doing it of course in a selective way – the existing experience, the

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1 The presented quotations and argument by Z. Liponski, undermining the opinion about the non-existence of the philosophy of sport, come from his extensive reviewer's opinion, which was passed to the publishing house of the Academy of Physical Education in Warsaw in 2004. He demonstrates in it – in some spacious fragments – the existence of the philosophy of sport in a categorical way.
existing effects of cognitive endeavors; that is, achievements (or, in other words, accomplishments) of the whole – if it can be described in such a way – to philosophy. In connection with this, during the creation of the philosophy of sport that philosophy is treated – in accordance with its neo-Platonic concepts – rather as the “art of arts” than as the highest form of knowledge. Thus, existing traditional and contemporary philosophy is solely the means serving the developing philosophical reflection on sport – both from the content-related and formal (that is, methodological) viewpoints.

The philosophy of sport is solely the receiver and applier of acknowledged and fixed results of inquiries in other, non-sport fields of research. And the maturity of any philosophical branch is recognized not only by its ability to transform and use what has been achieved somewhere else but also to bring new qualities, original assumptions and contexts of justification which are characteristic solely for it into general philosophy and into other philosophical branches.

But the situation of the philosophy of sport, when we look at it more closely, is quite different. For the time being it is something like a cognitive parasite. It draws and uses everything which could be useful for it, giving other forms of philosophy nothing in return. It is so because there is no feedback relationship (according to L. Kolakowski’s understanding of this term), which is characteristic for philosophy interpreted in a traditional way and which occurs when philosophy not only utilizes the achievements of other branches of knowledge, but also exerts back its inspiring influence, when it induces subsequent mental activities by its own cognitive achievements, by its generalizations of fulgurational (according to K. Lorenz’s interpretation) character.

There is not such a situation as, for example, in the philosophy of biology or in the philosophical theory of the system by L. von Bertalanffy, connected with the organismal concept of the human being understood as a functional structure, what has had a significant response in philosophical anthropology, in philosophy and in the theory of medicine or even in clinical medicine.

Inquiries from the area of Descartes’ philosophy of physics have exerted a significant influence on the philosophy of cosmos (a mechanist vision of the world), philosophical anthropology (a mechanist concept of the human being) and medical practise.

Z. Freud’s considerations from the area of psychoanalysis he created have significantly influenced the development of philosophical anthropology, the philosophy of medicine, psychiatric therapies and the appearance of new forms of biological psychoanalysis and of various forms of neo-psychoanalysis, oppositional in their relation towards the former ones, which has extremely enriched philosophical anthropologies and medical therapies. Freud’s psychoanalysis has been applied to the philosophy of art as well as to the theory of literature and drama. For example, Hamlet’s decision process, full of self-limitations, can be explained, although one-sidedly, by a reference to the traditional psychoanalytical Oedipus complex.

There are countless similar examples in this sphere. However, they do not regard the philosophy of sport.

G. McFee points out in the chapter “Are there philosophical issues with respect to sport (other than ethical ones)” that, as a matter of fact, there are no philosophical assumptions connected solely with or characteristic solely for reflection on sport; that we are involved only with applications of various philosophical ideas and forms of philosophical reflection in order to define, explain and – first of all – understand what is characteristic of activity in the area of sport.

He mentions in this context the four main spheres of his own philosophical interests, that is: freedom of action, philosophical anthropology (or a branch of philosophy, the object of investigation of which are human beings), and the normativity of rules and of aesthetics. He has referred to their content-related and methodological resources while explaining what sport is. He proclaims in connection with this that this kind of a research attempt does not constitute any argument for the thesis that the philosophy of sport exists, since in fact we have to do in this case with a move of a technical overtone, with

2 Nota bene, philosophy is treated contemporarily as a non-empirical branch of knowledge of a strictly theoretical character possessing intuitive qualities.

3 It refers to these neo-Platonic concepts of philosophy which are included in commentaries to Aristotle’s work edited since the 4th century BC (cf. J. Domanski: “Metamorphoses of the Notion of Philosophy”, Warsaw 1996, p. 7. The title of the original French edition: La philosophie, théorie ou manière de vivre? Les Controverses de l’Antiquité à la Renaissance, avec une Préface de Pierre Hadot, Fribourg-Paris 1996). The interpretation of philosophy as the “art of arts” – not the highest form of knowledge – means treating philosophy (similarly as in the middle ages) as something like a liberal art (the highest of arts) serving – in an instrumental sense – the development of the philosophy of sport. In the middle ages philosophy served first of all the development and improvement of Christian theology, which was described as the highest form of knowledge. In antiquity and later once again – beginning, among others, from Erasmus from Rotterdam – philosophy was conceived as the highest form of knowledge.

4 General methodology is treated by me as a philosophical discipline in a genetic and a functional sense, whereas specialist methodologies are – in my opinion – parts of particular specialized fields (cf. R. Wójcicki: “General methodology – Subject and research procedures”, Warsaw 1982).

a more or less effective applicative attempt, and sport is solely one of numerous cases which can be attributed to a given philosophical idea. Sometimes a particular case from the field of sport can be even more proper than others, e.g. in the didactical process connected with defining general principles and manifestations of the normativity of rules or the freedom of action.

Precisely the same can be said about the issues appearing in the book by the already mentioned H. Slusher (which constitute its table of contents at the same time). I will quote them after Lipiński for the sake of the clarity of reasoning: “Sport and Being (subchapters: Realms of Being; Being within Sport; Truth of Being; Ontological Truth – Foundation of Form; Recognition of Truth in Sport; The Body of Entity); Sport and Purpose (Sport – An Awareness of Human Action; Sport as a Situation; Sport as it is; Togetherness – As a Potential; Realization of the Self); Sport and Meaning (subchapters: The meaning of I; Sport – Relation and Meaning; Sport and the Symbol; the Meaning of the Perceived Reality; Sport as Human Absurdity); Sport and the Religious (Ritual: Sport as a Religious Symbol; Sport and Religion – As an Institution; Morality and Ethics; Allowing for the Existing Morality; The Element of Silence); Sport: Existence and Decision (subchapters: Perfection in Sport; A Production of Work and Play; Freedom as a Function: A Reality of Anxiety; Sport and Death).”

Those issues and the content connected with them are, according to Lipiński, the crown argument proving that the philosophy of sport has certainly already come into existence. What is obvious for the philosopher may be sometimes to difficult to understand and accept for a non-philosopher. I will repeat once more, that any application of philosophical assumptions in order to describe, explain or understand sport is not the philosophy of sport itself in its strict sense yet; it is an outmost philosophical reflection on sport (or, possibly, the philosophy of sport in an early stage of its development). Thus, sport can be only a particular case – a useful example facilitating considerations on, among other things, the theory of truth, the theory of freedom, ontology, anthropology, morality, reflection connected with the philosophy of existence or tanathology. Thus, e.g., Wittgenstein’s favorable example in his considerations in the field of the theory of games is chess.

Lipiński does not know Graham McFee’s standpoint, in spite of the fact that – as he proclaims himself: “Each title of current foreign literature can be, without exception, easily brought in from abroad.” If he knew current literature on the subject – let us remind ourselves that Slusher’s book is from 1967 and McFee’s from 1998 – he would probably be less categorical in his argument1 and maybe he would point out (I do not rule out such a standpoint), that there are at least two opposing viewpoints regarding the philosophy of sport. The first points out that it exists and the latter that it does not exist yet.

McFee in one of the parts of his text, entitled “Do we need a philosophy of sport?” questions the sense of its existence. He wonders if it is necessary at all and after a long argument he – this distinguished expert on Wittgenstein’s philosophy – announces that it is not. He proclaims, not without reason, that if in the process of the creation of the philosophy of sport we are deliberating solely upon the application of philosophy to reflection on sport, the philosophy of sport as such is in fact totally redundant. General philosophy will suffice as a theoretical basis for the reflection on sport, for understanding its sense, meaning, essence, etc. With such a theoretical assumption, we will have to make do – as I suppose – rather with philosophical reflection on sport than with any form of the philosophy of sport. Nevertheless, reference to achievements of philosophy as a whole is a condition for this philosophy’s coming into being. And philosophical reflection on sport is the first step on the way to the philosophy of sport.

Neither is the fact that many distinguished philosophers have brought up issues connected with sport an argument for the existence of the philosophy of sport – contrary to that which is proclaimed by Lipiński. Introducing “sports metaphors and references to ancient sport (...) the reconstruction of spiritual and bodily experiences which had been acquired by Plato through his participation and victories, and the projection of these experiences in his later philosophy” certainly is not evidence of the creation and coming into being of the philosophy of sport – they are only traces of his experience as a competitor met in his dialogues which were written later. Moreover, references to or making use of examples taken from sport are after all only applications of sport-related issues, not philosophy. The same refers to Hobbes, who allegedly was of the opinion that it was just sport (he used to play royal tennis) and singing in bed that ensured longevity for him, or even to Sartre, who voices his views on sport in a more extensive way in “Being and Nothingness” (1956), but it is not the philosophy of sport yet.

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1 This thesis is confirmed for instance, similarly as by all books from the field of the so-called philosophy of sport, by the monograph by Peter J. Arnold “Meaning in movement”, “Sport and physical education” (London 1979). Its review, entitled “Physical activity as reflected by phenomenology” was presented by me in International Review of Sport Sociology (1982, No. 4). The author uses in his book classical phenomenology to present new meanings and senses of various forms of sport activity, a “true picture of human fitness”, to present and characterize a lost paradigm – human motor activity – in a new way.

2 W. Lipiński recognizes all “judgements about the supposed non-existence or underdevelopment of that discipline” – that is, the philosophy of sport – to be false.
A sufficient argument for the existence of the philosophy of sport is also not constituted by a huge number of papers and books. Liponski announces that: "In the bibliography of the academic handbook of the philosophy of sport by C. Thomas 'Sport in a philosophic context', published in 1983, there were 455 titles referring to the philosophy of sport taken into account", and that currently this number is greater by at least 50%. That argumentation does not convince me at all. Maybe it is sufficient for the followers of Engels and his view, proclaimed in the "Dialectics of Nature", that quantity changes into quality. I would like to remark that this principle has not been proven to be correct and not only in the case of philosophy.

Neither does this argument sound convincing in confrontation, for example, with works by Aristotle, Pomponazzi or Descartes. They wrote – the first of them in antiquity, the second in the 15th and the third in the 17th century – excellent books about the human soul (On the Soul and on the Immortality of the Soul as well as on the Soul’s Passion), but it does not follow at all that since as early as the times of their publication it has been permissible to speak about the existence of psychology, which in fact came into being a long time later. The above mentioned authors – as well as many others – from Orphics or ancient philosophers (including Christian ones), through medieval philosophers to contemporary ones – can be pointed out only as forefathers of this fascinating academic discipline. In the case of the philosophy of sport the situation is similar – probably it will appear much later.

By the way, also in the framework of philosophy as such there is a public dispute as to whether philosophy is a science or not, which appears at conferences and in specialist magazines and which becomes aggravated from time to time. That debate is very valuable from the epistemological viewpoint, since it suits making deeper reflection on this discipline and facilitates defining its identity. It relates also to the discussion about the philosophy of sport – if it already is in existence or if it is still necessary to wait for its coming into existence (and why it is so).

Paradoxically, these are just texts by me and Graham McFee expressing epistemological skepticism towards the philosophy of sport that can be regarded as texts from the field of that philosophy, since they deal – of course, in a critical way – with the hitherto attempts to create it and point out, among other things, the conditions of its identity.

Nota bene, a dispute about the existence or non-existence of the philosophy of sport can be settled in one more way, which is presented below.

There is a question which arises in this context: is philosophical reflection on sport philosophy in the full meaning of the word or not? I think that if we are talking about philosophical reflection in the strictest sense, it is permissible in some way to proclaim that – in spite of the criticism, which is justified in this respect – we are dealing with philosophy as such.

It refers – firstly – to philosophy in the form of the thinking thought, which presents itself, and which expresses and objectifies solely human cognitive abilities and qualities. It manifests itself e. g. in meditations by Descartes, who presents solely his own views worked out by himself, which have not been derived from other unnatural sources and inspirations.8

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8 The given viewpoint assumes that every theory has its author, that there is no philosophy in a general sense. In connection with this, each philosophy is the philosophy of a particular subject, of its creator. It constitutes an expression of his thoughts. Thus, it exists as a being, as a creation of a given individual, which can be regarded in an ontological sense; that is, from the viewpoint of the theory of being. This way – that is, in the form of philosophical thought – cognitive mental qualities of the author become explicated and they
Secondly, it refers to a human thought, coming from a transcendental or a transcendent, ideal (religious or non-religious) reality, which objectifies itself in the subject independently from us – such as it is assumed by the Hegelian concept of the Absolute, which realizes itself in individual and collective consciousness. A human being is an instrument or a medium in the hands of the Absolute, being unaware of its role and only transmitting knowledge which has come into being and is revealed in it. We is not aware that it is not we who think. We do not know that it is the Absolute that manifests itself, thinks in our thoughts; that it is the Absolute’s wisdom, logic that objectifies itself in human views.

The situation is similar with the collective consciousness. People are sure that it is created by them, that culture, art, morality, religion, state, and philosophy are their exceptional species-specific qualities ascribed solely to them – their sublimated creations, whereas manifestations of both collective and individual consciousness are only evidence of the Absolute’s necessary self-creation and self-affirmation – not of human activity.

It can be assumed, taking into account the two above mentioned concepts of philosophizing, that each form of reflection revealing itself within their framework is philosophy, since philosophical considerations – fulfilling methodological and content related requirements formulated towards institutional and non-institutional philosophy, and objectified in a verbal or a written form – are philosophy. That is why it is somehow permissible to maintain that philosophical reflection on sport is philosophy, since in this case philosophy as such focuses its attention on sport. Thus, it can be maintained that we are talking about the philosophy of sport even if the philosophy of sport does not exist in a formal sense. However – in order not to introduce a paradox and, at the same time, an ontological dissonance – concerning the simultaneous existence and non-existence of the philosophy of sport – from the viewpoint of philosophy it is better to use the notion of philosophical reflection on sport.

**FILOSOFIE SPORTU**

**NEBO FILOSOFICKÉ UVÁZOVÁNÍ O SPORTU**

(Souhrn anglického textu)

Hlavním úkolem prezentace je iniciovat diskusi o současném postavení, formální a meritorní situaci filosofie sportu. Zajímavé je odpovědět si na následující otázku: lze říci, že máme co do činění se skutečnou, vyspělou, kompetentní a nezávislou vědní disciplinou, nebo jde spíše o určité filosofické úvahy o sportu, které se v budoucnu stanou nezávislou filosofickou disciplínou?

Jsem toho názoru, že filosofie sportu teprve zahájila proces strukturализace, kladení a řešení mnoha problémů, vytváření různých názorových pohledů, které jsou charakteristické pro autory s různým vzděláváním a s různými výzkumnými prioritami. Započala také stavbu základů a utváření metodologických nástrojů, které budou vhodné pro tento nový obor filosofie usilující o nezávislost. Hlavní běžně výzkumných projektů a jejich realizaci spočívá na bedřich filosofů v pravém slova smyslu, kteří budou zkoumat různé projevy a aspekty sportu.

Filosofie sportu se snaží definovat sebe samu a rozpracovávat své charakteristiky a formy výzkumu. Důležitou příležitostí je pro ní spolupráce s dalšími obory filosofie (a nejen filosofie) s cílem využít již vypracované a výzkoušené struktury umožňující filosofii sportu formuovat svůj vlastní jazyk, koherentní kód, kategorii pojmů a specifickou podrobnou metodologii sloužící pro popis a vysvětlení zdrojů, obsahů a významů, kterými se vyznačují praktické a teoretické projevy a vlastnosti sportu. Dokud však nebude tato etapa utváření nové disciplíny ukončena, budeme mít co do činění spíše s filosofickými úvahami o sportu než s filosofií sportu.

**Klíčová slova: filosofie sportu, filosofické úvahy o sportu, použití.**

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